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Nadine Dijkstra1* and Leon de Bruin2
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In this paper, we investigate to what extent it is justified to draw conclusions about 
causal relations between brain states and mental states from cognitive neuroscience 
studies. We first explain the views of two prominent proponents of the interventionist 
account of causation: Woodward and Baumgartner. We then discuss the implications 
of their views in the context of traditional cognitive neuroscience studies in which the 
effect of changes in mental state on changes in brain states is investigated. After this, 
we turn to brain stimulation studies in which brain states are manipulated to investigate 
the effects on mental states. We argue that, depending on whether one sides with 
Woodward or Baumgartner, it is possible to draw causal conclusions from both types of 
studies (Woodward) or from brain stimulation studies only (Baumgartner). We show what 
happens to these conclusions if we adopt different views of the relation between mental 
states and brain states. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for psychiatry 
and the treatment of psychiatric disorders.
Keywords: interventionism, causal exclusion problem, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, mental causation
introdUCtion
Traditionally, cognitive neuroscientists have been probing the relation between brain states and men-
tal states by manipulating the mental state of the participant through different conditions and then 
measuring the associated changes in neural activity, for example by means of Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) or Electro-encephalogram (EEG). The results of these manipulations are 
usually taken to reflect a correlation between mental states and brain states, rather than a “genuine” 
causal relation. According to several neuroscientists, however, new brain stimulation techniques, 
such as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) and Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), allow us to 
go beyond correlations and establish causal relations between mental states and brain states [for a 
review, see Ref. (1)]. This has important implications for other disciplines in which these techniques 
become increasingly popular. For example, in psychiatry, DBS has proven to be an effective treatment 
for patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) who do not respond to pharmacotherapy or 
psychotherapy (2–4).
In the current paper, we investigate whether and to what extent it is indeed justified to draw 
conclusions about causal relations between brain and mental states on the basis of cognitive neu-
roscience studies. In the next section, we start with a description of an interventionist account of 
causation, which is inspired by Woodward (5). We argue that this account is more or less in line 
with how causation is understood in scientific practice. The question is, however, whether it can be 
used to make causal claims about the interaction between mental states and brain states. In order 
to address this question, we introduce the notion of supervenience in Section “Mental States and 
Brain States: A Supervenience Relation.” This notion aims to capture the intuition that mental states 
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are dependent on, but not identical with, brain states. In Section 
“Causation in Traditional Cognitive Neuroscience Studies,” we 
turn to Baumgartner’s “causal exclusion” argument. According to 
this argument, the assumption of a supervenience relation vio-
lates the criteria of what counts as a good intervention. As a result, 
we cannot draw conclusions about the causal relation between 
mental states and brain states. In his reply to Baumgartner, 
Woodward (6) proposes to adjust these intervention criteria in 
order to make room for supervenience relations and to secure 
causal claims on the basis of traditional cognitive neuroscience 
studies. In Section “Causation in Brain Stimulation Studies,” we 
discuss the consequences of both positions for causal claims on 
the basis of brain stimulation studies. Most importantly, we will 
show that Baumgartner’s causal exclusion argument does not 
apply to these studies. That is, we can make causal claims about 
brain stimulation studies even if we assume a supervenience 
relation and accept Woodward’s original intervention criteria. In 
Section “Articulating the Mind–Brain Relation,” we show what 
happens to these conclusions if we adopt a different view of the 
relation between mental states and brain states. Finally, in Section 
“Conclusion,” we briefly discuss the implications of our findings 
for psychiatry and the treatment of psychiatric disorders.
tHe interVentionist aCCoUnt  
oF CaUsation
In most textbooks on experimental research two main require-
ments are described that an experiment must meet to be able 
to reveal a causal relation between X and Y. The first is that the 
levels of X must be systematically varied and the second is that 
all variables other than X and Y are to be controlled in order to 
eliminate other possible causes of Y. If these requirements are met 
and changes in X are accompanied by changes in Y, one is allowed 
to speak of a causal relation between X and Y (7, 8).
This notion of how to investigate causal relations in scientific 
practice is very much in line with a philosophical account of 
causation that has become quite popular recently: intervention-
ism. One of the most established interventionist definitions of 
causation comes from Woodward (5):
(M) A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a 
(type-level) direct cause of Y with respect to a variable 
set V is that there be a possible intervention on X that 
will change Y or the probability of Y when one holds 
fixed at some value all other variables Zi in V. A neces-
sary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) 
contributing cause of Y with respect to variable set V is 
that (i) there be a directed path from X to Y such that 
each link in this path is a direct causal relationship… 
and that (ii) there be some intervention on X that will 
change Y when all other variables in V that are not on 
this path are held fixed [Ref. (5), pp. 59].
We mainly focus on the definition of a direct cause since this 
comes closest to the notion of causation as it is investigated in 
scientific practice (i.e., it explicitly involves the two requirements 
mentioned above). However, for the definition to make sense, we 
also need a clear notion of what an appropriate intervention is. 
Woodward (5) defines an intervention variable as follows:
(IV) I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y if:
1. I causes X;
2. I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X. That 
is, certain values of I are such that when I attains those values, 
X ceases to depend on the values of other variables that cause 
X and instead depends only on the value taken by I;
3. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does 
not directly cause Y and is not a cause of any causes of Y that are 
distinct from X except, of course, for those causes of Y, if any, 
that are built into the I–X–Y connection itself; that is, except 
for (a) any causes of Y that are effects of X (i.e., variables that 
are causally between X and Y) and (b) any causes of Y that are 
between I and X and have no effect on Y independently of X.
4. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes 
Y and that is on a directed path that does not go through X 
[(5), pp. 98].
Finally, relative to the notion of an intervention variable an 
(actual) intervention can be straightforwardly understood in 
terms of an intervention variable I for X with respect to Y taking 
on some value zi such that I = zi causes X to take on some deter-
minate value zj [(5), pp. 98]. In terms of experimental design, 
an intervention can be seen as a manipulation that changes the 
variable X. In order for this manipulation to be able to reveal a 
causal relation, it has to meet the requirements in (IV).
MentaL states and Brain states:  
a sUperVenienCe reLation
Can we use interventionism to make causal claims about the 
interaction between mental states and brain states? To answer 
this question, we will (initially) assume a very minimal relation 
between mental states and brain states  –  one that captures the 
intuition that mental states are dependent on brain states. In the 
philosophy of mind, this relation is known as “supervenience.”
A schematic representation of a supervenience relation 
between mental states M1 and M2 and brain states P1 and P2 is 
depicted in Figure 1. Although the notion of supervenience has 
been much discussed, there are two features that are common in 
most definitions:
(S1) ¬(M causes P) ∧ ¬(P causes M);
(S2) Every change in the value of M is necessarily accompanied 
by a change in the value of P.
This means that (i) supervenience is a non-causal relation such 
that neither M causes P nor vice  versa1 and (ii) any change in 
mental state is necessarily accompanied by a change in brain state. 
Furthermore, with regard to Figure 1, we will assume that:
(S3) P1 causes P2.
1 Supervenience is non-causal because it represents a synchronic rather than a 
diachronic relation between M and P.
FigUre 2 | schematic representation of the relation investigated in 
traditional cognitive neuroscience studies indicated by the dashed 
arrow.
FigUre 1 | schematic representation of the relation between brain 
states and mental states. Undirected edges indicate supervenience 
relations and the arrow indicates a causal relation.
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The end result is a schematic representation of two types of 
relations: one between properties (M1 and P1, M2 and P2), which 
is captured by a supervenience relation, and one between events 
(M1/P1 and M2/P2), which is captured by a causal relation (i.e., 
event 1 causes event 2).
CaUsation in traditionaL CognitiVe 
neUrosCienCe stUdies
With the interventionist account of causation and the notion of 
supervenience in place, let us now take a closer look at traditional 
(non-invasive) cognitive science studies.
In most of these studies, the relation between mental states 
and brain states is investigated by observing the effect of changes 
in mental state M1 on brain state P2 (see Figure 2). This is done 
by manipulating the mental state of the subjects by letting them 
participate in separate conditions that differ on some stimulus 
characteristic or task that is meant to induce changes in M1. To 
investigate the effect of these manipulations on brain states, the 
subjects’ brain activity P2 is measured in all conditions. Then, if 
the researcher has made sure that the conditions only differ on 
the manipulated mental variable (using all kinds of controls like 
randomization of subjects), and a (significant) difference in brain 
activity between the conditions is found, the researcher concludes 
that the manipulated mental variable M1 has had an effect on the 
measured brain state P2.
However, is it valid to conclude that the change in mental state 
M1 caused the change in brain state P2? According to the causal 
exclusion argument put forward by Baumgartner (9), it is not.
Baumgartner’s Causal  
exclusion argument
In his argument, Baumgartner (9) takes together the intervention-
ist definition of causation as described above in (M) and (IV) and 
the supervenience relation as described in (S1–2) to formulate the 
following conditional:
(BM) If M1 is causally relevant to P2 with respect to the 
variable set V = {M1, M2, P1, P2}, then there possibly 
exists a variable I1 that causes a change in the value (or 
the probability distribution) of M1 and is statistically 
independent of any variable Z that causes P2 and that 
is on a directed path that does not go through M1 [(9), 
pp. 170].
Now we can see that no such variable I1 can exist. Because of 
the supervenience relation between M1 and P1, any variable I1 
that causes a change in M1 also causes a change in P1 (S2) and 
this variable P1 is on a causal path to P2 that does not go through 
M1 (S3). In other words, every time we perform an interven-
tion on a subjects’ mental state, by manipulating some variable 
in separate experimental conditions, we also intervene on their 
brain state. This is not because the change in mental state causes 
the change in brain state (recall that a supervenience relation is 
not a causal relation; S1), but because the intervention changes 
both the mental state and the brain state (S2). In other words, we 
cannot control the effect of P1 on P2. It follows that we cannot 
draw any conclusions about the causal effect of the intervention 
on the mental state. Furthermore, because the relation between 
M1 and P1 is not a causal relation, we also cannot say that M1 is 
a contributing cause to P2. In the context of an experiment, we 
would say that P1 is a confounding variable for which we cannot 
control, prohibiting any statement to be made about the causal 
effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.
Woodward’s response
In reply to Baumgartner’s argument, Woodward (6) proposes that 
when assessing causation in a variable set that includes super-
venience relations between variables, it is not necessary to control 
for or hold fixed the supervenience base. Thus, it is not necessary 
to control for P1 when assessing the relation between M1 and 
P2. According to Woodward, this is because the interventionist 
account of causation as defined by (M) and (IV) is intended to 
apply to systems of causal relations in which no non-causal rela-
tions (such as supervenience relations) exist. It is not at all clear 
whether it is applicable to a system in which non-causal relations 
are present.
Woodward illustrates this by giving an example of a 
variable set in which non-causal relations are present that are 
FigUre 4 | schematic representation of the relation investigated in 
brain stimulation studies as indicated by the dashed arrow.
FigUre 3 | schematic representation of the relation between aC, WC, 
tC, and H.
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not supervenience relations (6). His example goes along the 
following lines. Suppose that getting a headache (H) is causally 
influenced by the amount of alcohol consumption (AC), which 
increases the probability of getting a headache, and the amount 
of non-alcoholic liquid consumption (NC), which decreases the 
probability of getting a headache. We also have a variable repre-
senting the total liquid consumption (TC), which is the sum of AC 
and NC. Assume that we also think of TC as causally influencing 
H. We can put all these variables together to get the schematic 
representation in Figure 3.
Suppose now that we want to investigate if AC is causally 
relevant for H. According to Baumgartner’s reading of (IV) and 
(M), this would mean that it has to be possible to change (inter-
vene on) AC without changing any other variable in Figure 4 
that is on a directed path to H that does not go through AC. 
We can see that this is not possible because TC is defined such 
that if AC changes, TC also changes. It seems strange to take 
this finding as evidence for there not being a causal relation 
between AC and H. Therefore, Woodward (6) concludes, the 
interventionist definition as put forward in (M) and (IV) is 
intended to only apply to systems of causal relations in which 
no non-causal relations exist. In systems with non-causal rela-
tions, one needs to hold fixed only the appropriate variables. In 
the variable set described in Figure 4, this means that if one 
wants to investigate the effect of AC on H, NC needs to be fixed, 
but TC does not.
Similarly, Woodward (6) argues, when one wants to investigate 
the causal effects of supervening variables, their supervenience 
base does not have to be fixed. This means that M1 can be causally 
relevant for P2 or in other words, according to this interpretation 
of interventionist causation, investigating the relation between 
mental states and brain states, as done in traditional cognitive 
neuroscience studies, by manipulating M1 and investigating its 
effect on P2 can reveal a causal relation between M1 and P2.
In conclusion, according to Baumgartner (9), one cannot 
draw any conclusions about causal relations between mental 
states and brain states from traditional cognitive neuroscience 
studies. However, according to Woodward (6), this is perfectly 
valid. In the next section, we will discuss both these positions 
in light of brain stimulation studies in which the brain states are 
manipulated to investigate the effects on mental states.
CaUsation in Brain  
stiMULation stUdies
Since the introduction of brain stimulation techniques such as 
TMS and DBS, it has become possible for scientists to directly 
manipulate (intervene on) the electrical activity in the brain. 
Many neuroscientists have been using these techniques to draw 
conclusions about the causal relations between brain states and 
mental states. The following are quotes from TMS and DBS stud-
ies published in high-impact journals:
“Making the causal link: frontal cortex activity and 
repetition priming” (10).
“Causal implication by rhythmic TMS of alpha fre-
quency in feature-based vs. global attention” (11).
“DBS of the subthalamic nucleus markedly improves 
the motor symptom’s of Parkinson’s disease, but causes 
cognitive side effects such as impulsivity” (12).
“Stimulation of a restricted site in the upper midbrain 
can cause major acute depression” (13).
Are these claims justified? In the present section, we will 
explore this question in light of Baumgartner’s and Woodward’s 
arguments. Before we continue, we should mention that a large 
part of the brain stimulation studies only focuses on the effects of 
changes in brain states on other brain states [e.g., Ref. (14–16)]. 
This is the relation between P1 and P2. As described in (S3), we 
assume that there exists a causal relation between these variables. 
Therefore, in these types of brain stimulation studies, it is per-
fectly justified to talk about causal effects.
In the brain stimulation studies in which the relation between 
brain states and mental states is investigated, this seems more 
complicated. In these studies, the relation between P1 and M2 as 
depicted in Figure 4 is investigated. P1 is manipulated by stimu-
lating a certain brain area using TMS or DBS in one condition and 
not stimulating it in another condition, while measuring some 
mental variable M2 in both conditions. The researcher tries to 
make sure that the two conditions only differ on P and not on 
other variables, for example by applying sham stimulation in the 
control condition. If then a (significant) difference in M2 between 
the two conditions is found, the researcher concludes that there 
was an effect of the change in brain activity on the mental state. 
However, is he or she justified in saying that P1 has caused M2?
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Baumgartner’s approach
To determine whether Baumgartner’s argument applies to this 
experimental set-up, the conditional (BM) has to be redefined. 
If we switch the relevant terms, we get the following definition:
(BP) If P1 is causally relevant to M2 with respect to the 
variable set V = {M1, M2, P1, P2}, then there possibly 
exists a variable I1 that causes a change in the value (or 
the probability distribution) of P1 and is statistically 
independent of any variable Z that causes M2 and that 
is on a directed path that does not go through P1.
Interestingly, the causal exclusion argument used by 
Baumgartner (9) to conclude that M1 is not causally relevant to 
P2 does not work in this case. This is because there is no variable 
in V that causes M2 but does not go through P1. It is true that, 
because of the supervenience relation (S2), any intervention 
on P1 also changes M1. However, there is no causal relation 
between M1 and M2 that does not go through P1. Furthermore, 
an intervention on P1 also changes P2, through the causal 
relation mentioned in (S3), but according to (S1), P2 does not 
cause M2. So it seems that an intervention on P1 is possible 
without intervening on another variable that causes M2. This 
suggests that we actually can make causal claims on the basis 
of brain stimulation studies, even if we assume a supervenience 
relation and accept Woodward’s original intervention criteria. 
Let us now see whether Woodward’s approach leads to a similar 
conclusion.
Woodward’s approach
According to Woodward, if one wants to investigate whether P1 
is causally relevant to M2, one needs to perform an intervention 
to change the value of P, while holding fixed all appropriate other 
variables. When investigating the relation between P1 and M2, the 
supervenience base P2 is not one of these appropriate variables, 
so even if P2 were on a directed path to M2 that does not include 
P1, P2 does not have to be fixed because it is the supervenience 
base of M2.
The other possible candidate for a variable that is on a directed 
path to M2 that does not include P1, is M1. Now this seems to 
pose a problem. According to Woodward’s adjusted interpreta-
tion of interventionist causation, we can argue that M1 causes 
M2, because P1 and P2 do not have to be fixed. This seems to 
imply that M1 is an alternative cause for M2 making it impossible 
to conclude that P1 has caused M2. However, it seems that in his 
adaptation, Woodward (6) also argues that supervening variables 
do not have to stay fixed:
(IV*) An intervention I on X with respect to Y will (a) 
fix the value of SB(X) in a way that respects the super-
venience relationship between X and SB(X), and (b) the 
requirements in the definition (IV) are understood as 
applying only to those variables that are causally related 
to X and Y or are correlated with them but not to those 
variables that are related to X and Y as a result of super-
venience relations [(6), pp. 32].
This means that M1 does not have to be fixed in order to draw 
a causal conclusion about the relation between P1 and M2 by 
intervening on P1.
Thus, according to Woodward’s adjusted interpretation of 
interventionist causation, brain stimulation studies in which 
appropriate controls are applied, such as randomization of groups 
and application of sham stimulation in the control group, are suit-
able to base conclusions about the causal effect of brain states on 
mental states on.
In conclusion, if one follows Woodward, we can make claims 
about causal relations between brain states and mental states 
from the results of both traditional cognitive neuroscience and 
brain stimulation studies. However, for this to work, we do have 
to adjust the original interventionist criteria (5) and accept a non-
causal supervenience relation. According to Baumgartner, by 
contrast, we cannot make claims about causation from the results 
of traditional cognitive neuroscience studies. However, even if we 
do not adjust the original criteria, we can still draw conclusions 
about causation from brain stimulation studies.
artiCULating tHe  
Mind–Brain reLation
The conclusions drawn in the previous sections rely heavily on 
the assumption of a supervenience relation between brain states 
and mental states. We believe that most neuroscientists would 
agree with this assumption. Quoting one of the key textbooks in 
cognitive neuroscience programs: “Cognitive neuroscience is an 
academic field concerned with the scientific study of biological 
substrates underlying cognition, with a specific focus on the neu-
ral substrates of mental processes” [(17), p. 12]. This definition 
suggests that what lies at the heart of cognitive neuroscience is 
a dependency relation between mental states (“cognition”) and 
brain states (the “neural substrate”).
Supervenience is not a “deep” explanatory relation; however, 
it only indicates the presence of a dependence relation without 
telling us what it is (18). A common way to further explain this 
dependency is by appealing to the notion of emergence. Central to 
emergentism is the idea that supervenient properties are “novel” 
properties over and above the properties upon, which they super-
vene. In the context of the mental causation debate, emergentism 
can be understood as the more specific claim that mental states 
are the emergent properties of a complex physical system, which 
have their own causal power and cannot be reduced to the basic 
physical properties of this system.2 It is also possible to explain 
the dependence relation between mental and physical properties 
in terms of reduction. In contrast to emergentism, reductionism 
claims that supervenient properties are reducible to their base 
properties, and hence that mental properties are reducible to 
physical properties.
Thus far we have investigated whether interventionism allows 
us to make causal claims about the relation between mental states 
2 See, e.g., Ref. (19, 20) for specific accounts of supervenient emergentism in (cogni-
tive) neuroscience.
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and brain states, given a notion of supervenience that in principle 
allows mental states to be causally efficacious qua mental. In 
other words, we have assumed a dependence relation between 
mental states and brain states that is non-reductive, in principle 
compatible with the notion of emergence, and less strong than an 
identity relation. However, some people might not agree with this 
characterization of the relation between mind and brain. What 
happens to the conclusions drawn in this paper when one wishes 
to assume a reductive relation between mental states and brain 
states instead? In what follows we will briefly explore this option 
and also consider the possibility of a causal relation.
type identity and Functional reduction
A radical reductive explanation of the supervenience relation is 
offered by the identity theory. This theory holds that mental states 
are brain states. The strongest version of the identity theory, the 
so-called “type-identity” theory, is reductionist in the sense that it 
states that specific types of mental states can be reduced to specific 
types of brain states (21). This theory would therefore claim that 
M1 = P1 and M2 = P2. Now it becomes almost trivial to show that 
an intervention on P1 can show a causal effect on M2: since we know 
that an intervention on P1 will cause a change in P2 (S3) and since 
M2 is now the same as P2, we can conclude that P1 causes M2. Thus, 
assuming a type-identity relation between brain states and mental 
states still allows us to draw conclusions about the causal effects 
of brain states on mental states from brain stimulation studies. 
Similarly, assuming a type-identity relation also makes it possible to 
draw conclusions about causal relations from traditional cognitive 
neuroscience studies: since we know an intervention on P1 causes 
a change in P2 and M1 = P1, we can conclude that M1 causes P2.
The identity theory faces two important problems. First of all, 
it does not really provide us with an explanation of why mental 
states are identical with brain states. Take the claim that water is 
H2O. In this case, we can explain the properties of water in terms 
of the molecules that constitute it (two hydrogen atoms and a 
single oxygen atom) and the way they are interrelated. Stating 
that mental states are identical with brain states does not provide 
us with such an explanation. Second, there is the problem of 
multiple realizability (22, 23). If (at least some) mental states can 
be realized by different brain states, which seems plausible given 
what we know about the plasticity of the human brain, then they 
cannot be identical with specific brain states.
An alternative model of reduction, functional reduction, has 
been proposed by Kim (18, 24). According to this model, mental 
states can be reduced in the following way:
Stage 1. Define M in terms of its “causal role,” i.e., in 
terms of the causal task C it performs.
Stage 2. Identify the “realizers” of M, i.e., the actual 
mechanisms that perform causal task C.
Stage 3. Develop an explanatory theory that explains 
how the realizers of M perform causal task C.
The causal claims about brain stimulation studies and tradi-
tional cognitive neuroscience studies that can be made on the 
basis of functional reductionism are similar to those that can be 
made on the basis of the identity theory. Furthermore, functional 
reductionism does provide an explanation of how mental states 
are realized by brain states, and it is entirely consistent with the 
phenomenon of multiple realizability (in the sense that Stage 2 
anticipates the existence of multiple lower-level realizers).
However, functional reductionism, like the identity theory, 
comes at a high price: it grants mental states causal power, but 
only in virtue of their being physical states. And this might be a 
hard pill to swallow, since many people believe that mental states 
do have causal power of their own, qua mental. It is precisely 
this intuition that is behind the debate between Baumgartner and 
Woodward in the first place.
a Causal relation
The second alternative that we will consider is one that postulates 
a causal relation between brain states and mental states, in the 
sense that P2 causes M2. Although most philosophers reject this 
possibility [with the notable exception of (25)], it might strike 
cognitive neuroscientists as a plausible option.
What can we conclude from brain stimulation studies if we 
assume that the relation between P2 to M2 is a causal relation 
(one that has been established by means of an appropriate inter-
vention)? In particular, can we still make causal claims about the 
relation between P1 and M2? At first glance, the problem seems to 
be that P2 is now on a directed path to M2 that does not include 
P1. However, it is precisely this relation that allows us to conclude 
that P1 is a contributing cause according to the second part of (M):
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-
level) contributing cause of Y with respect to variable set 
V is that (i) there be a directed path from X to Y such 
that each link in this path is a direct causal relation-
ship… and that (ii) there be some intervention on X that 
will change Y when all other variables in V that are not 
on this path are held fixed [(5), pp. 59].
Note that this was not possible when we assumed a superveni-
ence relation between P2 and M2 because in that case not every 
link on the path from P1 to M2 was a direct causal relation.
Unfortunately, this does not work when we want to make 
causal inferences from traditional cognitive neuroscience studies. 
M1 cannot have a causal effect on P2, because it is impossible to 
intervene on M1 without violating the second requirement of (IV):
2 I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause 
X. That is, certain values of I are such that when I attains 
those values, X ceases to depend on the values of other 
variables that cause X and instead depends only on the 
value taken by I.
Criterion 2 is violated because of the assumption that M1 is caused 
by P1. What this seems to show is that the assumption of a causal 
relation between brain states and mental states ultimately leads to 
epiphenomenalism, i.e., the thesis that mental states can be causally 
influenced by physical states, but have no causal efficacy themselves. 
It is probably safe to assume that most people will not really consider 
this an improvement over the minimal notion of mental causation 
provided by type identity and functional reduction.
A B
FigUre 5 | (a) Incorrect depiction of circular causation that fails to take into 
account the temporal relation between P1 and P2, and P2 and P1. (B) 
Correct depiction of circular causation that takes into account the spatial as 
well as the temporal relation between P1 and P2, and P2 and P1*, and 
illustrates the linear nature of circular causation.
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ConCLUsion
The aim of this paper was to investigate whether we can draw con-
clusions about causal relations between brain states and mental 
states from traditional cognitive neuroscience studies and brain 
stimulation studies, given an interventionist account of causation. 
We have argued that, if one follows Woodward in embracing the 
notion of supervenience and revising the criteria for what counts 
as an intervention, both types of studies can be used to establish 
causal claims. If, by contrast, one follows Baumgartner and his 
causal exclusion argument, traditional cognitive neuroscience 
studies cannot be used to establish causal claims but brain stimu-
lation studies can.
Brain stimulation is being used more and more as a form of 
treatment for psychiatric disorders. We have shown that from an 
interventionist point of view, it is valid to say that these brain 
stimulation treatments cause changes in mental states. Now this is 
not necessarily an argument in favor of these treatments. However, 
if Baumgartner is right, then it seems reasonable to conclude that 
brain stimulation treatments will become increasingly attractive. 
Unlike traditional cognitive neuroscience studies, they actually 
have the potential to elucidate the causal structure of certain psy-
chiatric disorders (i.e., the underlying causal relations between 
mental states and brain states). It is a safe bet that this will appeal 
to many psychiatrists.
At the same time, this conclusion is based on a “conservative” 
interpretation of interventionism, and a rejection of non-causal 
metaphysical relations between mental states and brain states such 
as supervenience. In this respect, Woodward’s position is much 
more “liberal,” insofar as it proposes adjusted intervention criteria 
and allows for the inclusion of non-causal relations between men-
tal states and brain states. One advantage of Woodward’s position 
is that it allows psychiatrists to draw conclusions about the causal 
structure of mental disorders from traditional cognitive neurosci-
ence (and not just brain stimulation studies). Another and perhaps 
even more important advantage is that it legitimates the claim that 
cognitive and behavioral therapy, aiming at influencing the mental 
state of a patient, can cause changes in the patient’s brain state.
A note of caution is required when applying our conclusions 
to psychiatric practice. When defining mental states and brain 
states as separate targets of intervention, we assume an ideal 
situation in which such a separation can be easily obtained, and 
Woodward’s intervention criteria are met. In practice, however, 
such a situation might be difficult to achieve. For example, in 
their paper on degeneracy, Price and Friston (26) have argued 
that different neural configurations can lead to similar mental 
states. This means that a disruption of one of these configurations 
by brain stimulation might not necessarily lead to a change in 
mental state. The experimenter who uses interventionism in the 
context of a single study would then be forced to conclude that 
there is no causal relation between the brain state and mental 
state in question. Now this scenario could be avoided by making 
sure that conclusions about causal relations between mental states 
and brain states are supported by multiple studies (controlling 
for both inter- and intra-individual variation). However, there 
might be a larger worry here, not just about the fact that the 
application of interventionism to single studies in practice might 
sometimes result in misguided causal claims, but also about the 
very  possibility of applying interventionism to cognitive neurosci-
ence studies.
For example, one might argue that various factors such as 
degeneracy, redundancy, path-dependency, non-linearity and 
complex feedback loops make it (theoretically) impossible to 
establish linear causal chains.3 In the light of this, several theorists 
have proposed a concept of “circular causation” (27–29). Circular 
causation, which is taken to be typical of a self-organizing system, 
is realized by the cooperation of the individual parts of the sys-
tem, yet it also governs or constrains the behavior of these indi-
vidual parts. A good illustration of circular causation is given by 
McGilchrist (30) in his account of the brain as a complex system: 
“Events anywhere in the brain are connected to, and potentially 
have consequences for, other regions, which may respond to, 
propagate, enhance or develop that initial event, or alternatively 
redress it in some way, inhibit it, or strive to re-establish equilib-
rium. There are no bits, only networks, an almost infinite array of 
pathways” (2010, p. 34).
Circular causation is attractive, but also slightly misleading – 
at least when it is articulated in opposition to linear causation. 
As Von Bertalanffy (31, 32) already pointed out, to make sense of 
circular causation we still require a notion of linear and “unidirec-
tional” causation. The kind of feedback regulation that is implied 
by circular causation is obviously not unidirectional in spatial 
terms: it moves back and forth or circles around the various 
components of a system (33). However, despite circling in space, 
feedback still proceeds forward in linear time, one component 
being separated from the next in time. Circular causation, thus 
understood, is compatible with the assumption of a superveni-
ence relation between mental states and brain states. The question 
is whether it is also compatible with interventionism. Let us say 
we propose a modified version of Figure 1 that involves feedback 
loops, for example one in which P1 causes P2 which in turns 
causes P1 (Figure 5A). Now, at first glance, such a feedback loop 
seems to violate the second requirement of (IV), in the sense that 
one might think that P1 not only depends on the value taken by 
I but also on the value of P2. However, the problem is that such a 
depiction of circular causation fails to take into account the fact 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention.
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that the relations between P1 and P2, and P2 and P1 are temporal 
relations between different events, and therefore they cannot be 
circular. That is, the P1 that causes P2 is different (not spatially, 
but temporally) from the P1 that is caused by P2 as the result of 
the feedback loop. The correct (linear) way to represent circular 
causation is shown in Figure  5B: P1 causes P2, and P2 causes 
P1* (which is temporally different, but spatially identical with 
P1). And this seems to be compatible with interventionism, to 
the extent that an intervention on P1 does not violate the second 
requirement of (IV).
It is important to note, at this point, that interventionism as 
such is relatively free of metaphysical commitments, in the sense 
that it does not make claims about how exactly one should spell 
out the relation between mental states and brain states. It only 
tells us what needs to be in place and which conditions need to 
be met for a given relation between variables to be described 
as “causal.” Furthermore, as we have shown in Section “The 
Interventionist Account of Causation,” one of the main attrac-
tions of interventionism is that it seems to correspond to how 
causal relations are investigated in scientific practice. Therefore, 
even if interventionism turns out to be incompatible with certain 
assumptions about brain functioning, such as circular causation 
and feedback loops, then this indicates a larger problem with 
mainstream scientific method and textbook accounts of experi-
mental research. Obviously, these are issues that deserve critical 
attention. For the purpose of this paper, however, we have taken 
the mainstream scientific method as our starting point.
In the end, how psychiatrists approach these issues will prob-
ably depend on their intuitions about interventionist causation 
and the relation between mind and brain. However, one thing 
is certain. What they conclude will have important implications 
for the way they communicate the effect of different treatments 
to their patients.
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